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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Christopher Matthew Thomas appeals from the district court's orders 
denying his motions for credit for time served. Thomas contends the district 
court erred in denying his request for credit for time served for time he spent 
incarcerated while he was on probation. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged Thomas with delivery of a controlled substance, 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and misdemeanor 
possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp. 9-10, 23, 25.) The state also 
charged Thomas with a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp. 30-31.) 
Thomas pied guilty to delivery of a controlled substance and the remaining 
counts were dismissed. (R., pp. 55-57.) On August 11, 2010, the district court 
sentenced Thomas to ten years with three years fixed. (Id.) The district court 
retained jurisdiction. (Id.) 
On March 16, 2011, the district court placed Thomas on probation. (R., 
pp. 64-67.) Thomas moved to correct the computation of credit for time served. 
(R., pp. 71-73.) The district court denied the motion because the court records 
showed he was given all the credit to which he was entitled. (Id.) 
In June 2011 the state filed a motion for probation violation. (R., pp. 86-
101.) Thomas admitted to violating his probation. (R., p. 126.) On January 29, 
2014, the district court revoked his probation but reduced his sentence to eight 
1 
years with three years fixed. (R., pp. 131-133.) The district court gave him credit 
for 467 days served. (Id.) 
On July 2, 2014, Thomas again moved to amend the amount of credit for 
time served. (R., pp. 134-135.) The district court reviewed the record and 
denied and the motion. (R., pp. 136-137.) Thomas appealed. (R., pp. 138-142.) 
On July 9, 2015, Thomas filed yet another motion for credit for time 
served in the district court. (See Motion for Credit Time Served, filed July 9, 
2015 (augmentation).) Thomas argued that he was entitled to an additional 260 
days of credit for a total credit of 727 days. (Id.; Affidavit of Defendant, filed July 
9, 2015 (augmentation).) 
The Idaho Supreme Court granted Thomas' motion to suspend the 
briefing schedule pending the outcome of Thomas' motion before the district 
court. (Order Suspending Briefing Schedule, filed August 11, 2015.) The district 
court denied Thomas' motion. (Order Denying Defendant's Request for Credit 
for Time Served, filed August 19, 2015 (augmentation).) The district court held: 
The Court has reviewed the motion and affidavit filed by the 
Defendant on July 9, 2015, and the record in this matter. The 
Court does not give credit for jail time when it is a term of 
probation, or discretionary jail time. The Defendant's motion is, 
therefore, hereby denied. 
(Id.) (emphasis original) After the district court entered its order, the appeal 
proceeded. (Order Granting Motion to Augment and Resume Briefing Schedule, 
filed August 28, 2015.) 
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ISSUE 
Thomas states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Thomas' motion for 
credit for time served. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Should this Court reject Thomas' claim that the district court erred in 
failing to give him credit for time served pursuant to statutory language that did 
not exist at the time the court entered judgment and that does not retroactively 
apply to the court's order? 
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ARGUMENT 
Thomas Has Failed To Show The District Court's Calculation Of Credit For Time 
Served Was Erroneous Based On Statutory Amendments That Were Not 
Effective When The Court Made The Calculation And That Are Not Retroactive 
A. Introduction 
Thomas contends the district court erred by not giving him credit for time 
served pursuant to statutory language that was not in effect when the court 
revoked his probation and gave him credit for time served. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 
6-13.) According to Thomas, despite the non-existence of the statutory language 
upon which he relies, the court nevertheless erred because the July 2015 
amendments to I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 are retroactive and require the 
district court to give him credit for all the time he served in custody while he was 
on probation. (Id.) 
Thomas is incorrect because his argument - that the legislature intended 
to render illegal all previously imposed sentences in which credit for time served 
as a condition of probation was not granted - is meritless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit 
for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is 
subject to free review by the appellate courts." State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 
68,122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 
779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)). The appellate courts "defer to the trial court's 
findings of fact, however, unless those findings are unsupported by substantial 
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and competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous." 
State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct App. 2006) (citing 
State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Ct. App. 2003)). 
C. Thomas' Claim That The Amendments To I.C. §§ 18-309 And 19-2603 
Should Be Given Retroactive Effect Is Meritless 
When the district court revoked Thomas' probation, the district court gave 
Thomas credit for 467 days served. (R., pp. 131-132.) Thomas does not argue 
that the district court erred in calculating credit for time served under the statutes 
in effect at the time. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 6-13. 1) Instead, Thomas' 
argument on appeal relies on the assertion that the July 2015 amendments to 
I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 are retroactive and that he is entitled to credit for 
time he served in custody while he was on probation. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 
6-10.) This argument fails. 
"In general, legislation acts prospectively" and "retrospective or retroactive 
legislation is not favored." Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 937, 318 P.3d 918, 
927 (2014) (quotations and citations omitted). "As such, a well-settled and 
fundamental rule of statutory construction is to construe statutes to have a 
prospective rather than retroactive effect." kl As amended effective July 1, 
2015, I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 provide that a defendant will receive credit for 
time served as a condition of probation. I.C. § 67-510 (governing effective date 
1 Below, Thomas requested credit for 727 days, but on appeal, he now claims he 
is entitled to 734 days of credit. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-12.) The discrepancy is 
irrelevant because both his calculations rely solely on the retroactivity of the 
2015 amendments. 
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of amendments). This newly-enacted language "is not applied retroactively 
unless there is clear legislative intent to that effect." Piercy, 155 Idaho at 937-
938, 318 P.3d at 927-928 (quotations and citations omitted). Such clear intent 
may be found either by an express statement of retroactivity or in the language 
of the statute requiring retroactive application. kl at 938, 318 P.3d at 928. "A 
statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon facts antecedent to 
its enactment" but is retroactive if it "changes the legal effect of previous 
transactions or events." Bryant v. City of Blackfoot, 137 Idaho 307, 313, 48 P.3d 
636, 642 (2002). 
The statutory language in the amendments shows that the legislature 
intended the amendments to apply at the time the court calculates time served 
upon imposing judgment. The amendment to I.C. § 18-309 provides: 
In computing the term of imprisonment when judgment has been 
withheld and is later entered or sentence has been suspended and 
is later imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered 
or imposed shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of 
incarceration served as a condition of probation under the original 
withheld or suspended judgment. 
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99, § 1, p. 240 (emphasis added). As the italicized 
language indicates, under the plain language of the amendment, the time the 
statute applies is upon entry of judgment after the probation violation has been 
found. Likewise, the amended I.C. § 19-2603 provides: 
When the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and 
conditions of probation, it may ... revoke probation. The defendant 
shall receive credit for time served ... for any time served as a 
condition of probation under the withheld judgment or suspended 
sentence. 
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2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99, § 2, p. 240 (emphasis added). Again, the 
contemplated time-frame for the awarding of credit for time served is at the time 
the court revokes probation. 
Nothing in the statutes as they existed or as amended suggests a 
legislative intent to render illegal prior calculations of time served. Rather, the 
statutes evince a clear intent that the amendments should apply only to those 
calculations of time served made after the amendments were effective. In this 
case, the district court entered its order revoking probation on January 29, 2014, 
more than a year before the amendments became effective. (R., pp. 131-132.) 
Nothing in the amendments indicates a legislative intent to render any part of 
that order retroactively illegal or erroneous. Because the amount of credit for 
time served was calculated before the amendments, those amendments are 
simply irrelevant to this appeal. 
Because Thomas has failed to show the amendments he relies on were in 
any way applicable to legal proceedings concluded before the amendments were 
effective, he has failed to show error. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
orders denying Thomas' motions for credit for time served. 
DATED this 20th day of November, 2015. 
/~ ~~/ }Eos.Tol.FSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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